

with cancer with hundreds of thousands of readers. But Susan was more than that. Her work has been a lighthouse beam through the fog of local and national politics," wrote the Wall Street Journal's Marilyn Chase. "She stands as a model of professionalism and courage in the workplace. The lesson for colleagues of cancer survivors: Professionalism doesn't disappear with a diagnosis."

Susan wrote movingly about the 180,000 women who get breast cancer each year. "I have metastatic breast cancer," she wrote last September. "It's a tough word to spell and an even harder one to say, but its meaning is rather simple. It means a runaway strain is careening through my body. I want there to be a face that goes with these statistics. It certainly doesn't have to be my face: it can be the face of someone you surely know and love who has had her life torn apart by this disease. This carnage has to stop. I wrote to plead for more and better research, for more and better treatment. Like too many women before me, I wrote to plead: Find something to save my life. To save all of our lives."

We can best remember Susan by working to ensure that America's families are spared the suffering she experienced.

MANDATORY GUN SHOW BACKGROUND CHECK ACT

SPEECH OF

HON. TERRY EVERETT

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 18, 1999

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2122) to require background checks at gun shows, and for other purposes;

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, during last week's consideration of the Gun Show Protection Act (H.R. 2122), my vote in support of the Rogan amendment to prohibit individuals who have committed "violent acts of juvenile delinquency" from possessing firearms as adults was not tallied by the electronic voting machine.

Although I opposed the underlying bill because the focus was on penalizing law-abiding citizens rather than criminals, I support the intent of the Rogan amendment to toughen penalties for violent criminals.

SPACE POLICY

HON. BOB SCHAFER

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Mr. SCHAFER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the important topic of America's space policy in the post-Cold War world. One of America's leading experts on this subject, Mr. James H. Hughes of Englewood, Colorado, has written many articles concerning this topic. I would like to submit Mr. Hughes' latest article entitled "Space Policy" for the RECORD.

The end of the Cold War brought with it the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and a euphoric victory, more completely realized after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The U.S.

sought to convert its "peace dividend" from winning the Cold War, into a new social order, rather than understanding the Cold War and seeking a responsible victory, much like the Marshall Plan after World War II.

Aided by a minor downturn in the economy and third party candidate Ross Perot who split the vote with George Bush, Bill Clinton won the 1992 presidential election, and utilized the "peace dividend" for an agenda of cutting spending for defense, and funding social programs. Accelerated spending of the "peace dividend" became a prominent theme in Bill Clinton's first term of office (1993-1997).

The Cold War victory of the U.S. was recognized by some as an incomplete victory. The Cold War—communism—had cost the Soviet Union dearly. The U.S. and Western Europe had won. The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc were in transition, coming out of their socialist state economies and dictatorships. While time has shown that the Eastern Bloc is becoming westernized with the introduction of freedom, democracy, and private enterprise (for example, East and West Germany have become unified), Russia and many of the former members of the U.S.S.R. remain in transition, ten years later.

Today, Russia is vacillating between forces for democracy and economic reform, versus a crime dominated underground economy run by gangs and mafia, many of whom served in the former communist government. In a sense, many of Russia's economic woes derive from its unfamiliarity with free enterprise, the market economy, and a very primitive infrastructure, not the "failure" of reform.

The Soviet Union collapsed because its economy had collapsed. No country can devote itself to war forever, even Sparta failed. In addition, communism in Russia had led to the economically inefficient—the wasteful development—of the Soviet economy. Stories were rampant about how a Sears Catalogue was viewed as subversive propaganda because it would show the Russian people how a free society lived.

The Soviet Union was a world power, a superpower, because of its warships, fighters, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles. It was not a superpower because of any intrinsic feature of its communist society. Only its vast mineral, oil, and gas resources, and the very high degree of technical training given to its scientists and engineers enabled the Soviet Union to produce nuclear arms and ballistic missiles, cloaking itself with military strength as a world superpower.

To pursue its agenda of world communism, the Soviet Union supported a defense establishment absorbing, toward the end of the Cold War, upwards of 30-40% of its GNP, and most of its industrial and scientific talent. In contrast, even at the height of President Reagan's buildup, the Cold War absorbed only 6% of U.S. GNP, and that within the context of a sophisticated research and development program and free enterprise economy. Thus, the failure of communism left the Soviet Union with its legacy of an industrial base designed for the inefficient production of weapons, rather than a thriving economy as in the U.S.

Leaders in Congress, recognizing the tremendous investment the Soviet Union made in the production of nuclear weapons, including the training of thousands of nuclear missile scientists and engineers, sought to avert the sale of this talent and its stockpile of nuclear weapons by means such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Nunn-Lugar sought to find ways to gainfully employ talented Soviet engineers and scientists outside the production of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Without such steps, it was feared, and correctly so as

events proved out in, for example, Iran, that other nations hostile to the U.S. would siphon off Russia's scientists, using them for their own weapons production programs.

The broader context of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program needs to be addressed. It was developed within the context of defending U.S. national security interests. A broader viewpoint should look at the role of Nunn-Lugar in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia, and U.S. defense and immigration policy.

1991 PERSIAN GULF WAR

The 1991 Persian Gulf War deserves some understanding. For it was after this war the U.S. felt itself vindicated in its application of advanced technology for defense (our high-tech weapons worked in the Gulf War), and in the development of war-fighting doctrine and training that reflected the lessons of Vietnam. The leaders of the Persian Gulf War, General Colin Powell, General Norman Schwarzkopf, and others of their generation, had served their time in Vietnam. They were dedicated to reforming the U.S. military from the inside, and did not wish to repeat Vietnam.

Our victory in the Persian Gulf War came through the coalition building efforts of President George Bush and Secretary of State Jim Baker, and the defense buildup initiated by President Reagan in the 1980s.

It is no small matter to realize we won the Persian Gulf War on the shoulders of the military force we had built to fight the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Bush had already begun the process of spending the "peace dividend" without respect to learning the main lesson of President Reagan's defense strategy—the importance of developing advanced technology with commercial applications, and the importance of ballistic missile defense to warfighting.

In this respect, the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s passed largely unnoticed and unstudied by the West. The Iran/Iraq war featured carnage and attrition. It also featured the use of ballistic missiles—Scuds—to attack each other cities in a war of terror. Thus, the Iran/Iraq war was a precursor, a warning, to Iraq's heavy of ballistic missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Congress responded to our vulnerability to ballistic missiles seen in the Gulf War (videos of incoming Scuds made an impression) by passing the 1991 Missile Defense Act. But this act, by itself, was not enough to prompt the U.S. to build a national missile defense, even though the warning bells were already being sounded over the proliferation of long range ballistic missiles, such as China's sale of intermediate range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia.

It does little good to criticize the past, but three lessons do stand out from the Gulf War that we need to absorb. First, U.S. military strength needs to be rebuilt. We have been in decline and decay for over a decade. Second, U.S. military strength needs to be redeveloped in the research and development of advanced technology. We need to fund new initiatives for advanced technology. Third, the U.S. needs to complete the plan of the Strategic Defense Initiative by deploying ballistic missile defenses in space.

We have yet to fully appreciate the role of space in our defense. It has been said the 1991 Persian Gulf War was a one-sided space war where the U.S. was able to freely use its satellites in space to give it leveraging over Iraq, in intelligence, communications, weather, and navigation. It is not as clearly recognized the Gulf War was also a one-sided space war from Iraq's side, where Iraq was able to launch its Scud ballistic missiles traveling through space. While the Air Force was successful in suppressing Iraq's use of